I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has been holding hearings on threats to the financial system in response to the recent subprime (or sub-prime) mortgage meltdown and its impact on the mortgage-backed, and other asset-backed, securities markets. 3 Central banks worldwide have likewise expressed concern about this crisis and its potential systemic effects. The United States Federal Reserve Bank, for example, is attempting to reduce the likelihood that this crisis might affect other financial markets and the economy by cutting the discount rate, which is the interest rate the Federal Reserve charges a bank to borrow funds when a bank is temporarily short of funds, 4 and also by cutting the federal funds rate that banks charge other banks on interbank loans. 5 The European Central Bank and other central banks similarly have been cutting the interest rate they charge to borrowing banks. 6 These steps, however, have directly impacted banks, not financial markets. 7 Furthermore, changes in monetary policy, such as cutting interest rates, may not work quickly enough-or may be too weak-to quell panics, falling prices, and the potential for systemic collapse. 8 This somewhat anachronistic focus on banks, not markets, ignores the ongoing trend towards disintermediation-or enabling companies to access the ultimate source of funds, the capital markets, without going through banks or other financial intermediaries. 9 We thus are using tools to protect the financial system that have not kept up with underlying changes in the system. 10 In a financially disintermediated world, the old protections may no longer be reliable.
This article explores why the subprime financial crisis occurred notwithstanding the array of existing protections included in financial regulation, market norms and customs, and the market-discipline approach undertaken by the second Bush administration, 11 and what this crisis can teach us about protecting financial markets. 12 The article begins by identifying anomalies and obvious protections that failed to work.
Bank cannot fully counter the forces of credit and liquidity contraction" caused by the subprime mortgage crisis). Cf. Seth Carpenter & Selva Demiralp, The Liquidity Effect in the Federal Funds Market: Evidence from Daily Open Market Operations, 38 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 901, 918-919 (2006) (concluding that although a change in monetary policy can begin to affect the cost of capital within a day, its full effects can take much longer); Serena Ng, Greg Ip, & Shefali Anand, Fed Fails So Far In Bid to Reassure Anxious Investors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2007, at A1. 9 Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309 REV. , 1315 REV. (2002 . Capital markets are now the nation's and the world's most important sources of investment financing. See, e.g., McKinsey Global Institute, Mapping the Global Capital Markets Third Annual Report (Jan. 2007) , reporting that as of the end of 2005, the value of total global financial assets, including equities, government and corporate debt securities, and bank deposits, was $140 trillion, available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/third_annual_report/index.asp. 10 Although there is some concern about capital levels at banks, the losses giving rise to this concern are not due to bad mortgage loans made by those banks but rather to investments in mortgage-backed securities or loans made to entities, such as hedge funds, holding mortgage-backed securities as assets. See infra note 51. See also David Wessel, Magnifying the Credit Fallout, WALL ST. J., March 6, 2008, at A2 (discussing the erosion of the capital level at banks due to the falling value of bank-owned mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities). 11 See, e.g., Anthony W. Ryan, Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Remarks before the Managed Funds Association Conference (June 11, 2007) (transcript on file with author), at 2 (discussing the market-discipline approach). 12 The term "subprime" includes both loans to borrowers of dubious creditworthiness and very large loans to otherwise creditworthy borrowers. MEGAN DORSEY & DAVID ROCKWELL, FINANCING: RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 60 (8th ed. 1990 ).
The article then searches for lessons by examining various hypotheses of why these anomalies and failures may have occurred.
II. IDENTIFYING ANOMALIES AND FAILURES
The following represent anomalies arising from, and protections that failed to deter, the subprime mortgage meltdown: (A) If disclosure provides investors with all the information they need to assess investments, why did so many investors make poor decisions? (B) Securitization and other forms of structured finance (collectively, "structured finance"), pursuant to which mortgage-backed and other forms of assetbacked securities are issued, are supposed to diversify and reallocate risk to parties best able to bear it. Is there something structurally wrong about how this worked in the mortgage context? (C) Why did a problem with the subprime mortgage-backed securities markets quickly infect the markets for prime mortgage-backed securities and other assetbacked securities? 13 (D) The second Bush administration expected that its marketdiscipline approach would be sufficient, along with existing protections, to protect against financial market instabilities. Why did this approach turn out to be insufficient? (E) Why did the rating agencies fail to anticipate the downgrades?
In order to examine hypotheses of why these anomalies and failures may have occurred, certain structured finance terminology must first be explained. The issuer of mortgage-backed and other forms of asset-backed securities in structured finance transactions is typically a special-purpose vehicle, or "SPV" (sometimes called a specialpurpose entity, or "SPE"). These securities are customarily categorized as MBS, ABS, CDO, or ABS CDO. 14 MBS means mortgage-backed securities, or securities whose payment derives principally or entirely from mortgage loans owned by the SPV. ABS means other asset-backed securities, or securities whose payment derives principally or entirely from receivables or other financial assets-other than mortgage loans-owned by the SPV. Industry participants refer to transactions in which SPVs issue MBS or ABS as securitization.
The term "securitization" also technically includes CDO and ABS CDO transactions. CDO, or "collateralized debt obligation," securities are backed by-and thus their payment derives principally or entirely from-a mixed pool of mortgage loans and/or other receivables owned by an SPV. ABS CDO securities, in contrast, are backed by a mixed pool of ABS and/or MBS securities owned by the SPV, and thus their payment derives principally or entirely from the underlying mortgage loans and/or other receivables ultimately backing those ABS and MBS securities. 15 For this reason, ABS CDO transactions are sometimes referred to as "re-securitization."
Schematically, the distinctions among these categories can be portrayed as follows: The senior and many of the subordinated classes of these securities are more highly rated than the quality of the underlying receivables. 17 For example, senior securities issued in a CDO transaction are usually rated AAA even if the underlying receivables consist of subprime mortgages, and senior securities issued in an ABS CDO transaction are usually rated AAA even if none of the MBS and ABS securities supporting the transaction are rated that high. This is accomplished by allocating cash collections from the receivables first to pay the senior classes and thereafter to pay more junior classes (the so-called "waterfall" of payment). In this way, the senior classes are highly overcollateralized to take into account the possibility, indeed likelihood, of delays and losses on collection.
The subprime financial crisis occurred because, with home prices unexpectedly plummeting and adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) interest rates skyrocketing, 18 many 15 "Synthetic" CDOs, which do not appear to be relevant to this article's analysis, own derivative instruments, such as credit default swaps, rather than receivables, ABS, or MBS. 16 In MBS and ABS transactions, the term "equity" is not generally used because the company originating the securities (the "Originator") usually holds, directly or indirectly, the residual claim against the SPV. 17 The equity class is generally not rated. 18 Investors in these securities lost billions, 21 creating a loss of confidence in the financial markets.
III. SEARCHING FOR LESSONS
A. If disclosure provides investors with all the information needed to assess investments, why did so many investors make poor decisions?
For this anomaly and failure, this article examines the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis: The disclosure was inadequate because the depth of the fall of the housing market exceeded reasonable worst-case scenarios. Mortgage loans, which were the asset class supporting the MBS as well as a significant portion of the CDO and ABS CDO securities, therefore turned out to be severely undercollateralized in many cases.
Any failure to envision the actual worst-case scenario may have reflected, to some extent, a failure to take a sufficiently long view of risk. Some explain the near-collapse of readily or at prices that will enable you to realize your desired yield. The market value of the [securities] are likely to fluctuate; these fluctuations may be significant and could result in significant losses to you." I therefore believe that the problem was less failure of the illiquidity risk to be disclosed than investor failure to appreciate that disclosure. See infra notes 24-39 and accompanying text. Query, however, whether anyone knew-much less knew enough to disclose-the extent of the illiquidity problem. See e-mail from Bookstaber, supra (observing that "no one knew how levered funds were, and therefore how quickly they would need to dump [securities] if they faced a market shock"). 25 But cf. Amir Sufi, "Lender Incentives, Credit Risk, and Securitization: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis" (April 2008 draft on file with author) (arguing, at 17, that investors and rating agencies "likely did not fully appreciate that the mortgage supply expansion itself was in part driving house price appreciation in subprime areas"). In other words, Professor Sufi is arguing that home prices dropped radically, as a percentage, once Python memorably put it (in a different context), "Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition!" 26 Some failures to take a sufficiently long view of risk reflect behavioral bias due to associations with recent similar events. Those failures are discussed separately. 27
Hypothesis: The disclosure was adequate, but many investors failed to read it carefully enough or appreciate what they were reading.
This hypothesis has several possible sub-hypotheses contributing to the ultimate failure. The first is over-reliance, insofar as investors may have relied heavily, and perhaps in some cases exclusively, on third parties. For example, one commentator argues that investors over-relied on the underwriter or arranger selling them the securities:
Investors have the prospectuses to rely on, but the reality is that they have not taken any responsibility for reading the detail of the documentation or digesting the risks involved. These investors are still under the impression that the arranger will look after their interests and are yet to appreciate the need to negotiate what are highly complicated bilateral agreements. 28
Because this flies in the face of caveat emptor, it seems dubious unless the underwriter/arranger's interests were aligned with that of the investors. 29 Investors also may have over-relied on rating-agency ratings, without necessarily engaging in (or at least fully performing) their own due diligence. This article later examines why rating agencies failed to anticipate the downgrades. 30 Even if investors performed their own due diligence, agency-cost conflicts 31 and lack of economy of scale 32 may have limited the extent to which they could have done a better job of assessing creditworthiness than the rating agencies.
Another sub-hypothesis is that, as a result of a market "bubble," "many investors, swept up in the euphoria of the moment, failed to pay close attention to what they were buying." 33 Bubbles can start quite easily. If, for example, a particular stock unexpectedly gains in value, the losers (e.g., those shorting the stock) will tend to withdraw from that market and the winners will tend to increase their investment, driving up the price even further. Soon other winners are attracted to the stock and other losers cut their losses and stop shorting the stock. This process is aided by almost inevitable explanations of why it is "rational" for the price to keep going up and why the traditional relationship of price to earnings does not apply. Even investors who recognize the bubble as irrational may buy in, hoping to sell at the height of the bubble before it bursts. 34 ondholders can-and will-fuss all they like. But the reality is, their options are limited: higher returns or better protection. Most investors will continue to go for the gold.") (discussing, in the context of but several years after the "Marriott split," that investors favor higher interest rates over "event risk" covenants once examples of events justifying the covenants have receded in memory, even though they could reoccur).
Hypothesis:
The disclosure was inherently inadequate because the transactions were so complex that many investors could not understand them. 40 This hypothesis turns on the extraordinary complexity of CDO and ABS CDO transactions. The prospectus itself in a typical offering of these securities is, in the author's experience, hundreds of pages long. 41
This hypothesis, if true, would extend the thesis in Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity 42 beyond investors in an Originator's 43 securities to investors in an SPV's securities. The proposal of that article nonetheless can help to inform the analysis. That article proposes that investors in an Originator's securities be protected in a supplementary manner by restricting conflicts of interest in complex transactions for which disclosure would be insufficient. 44 The rationale is that, absent conflicts, the Originator's management will make decisions that more closely reflect the interests of the Originator's investors.
The same approach has potential application to investors in an SPV's securities, particularly when the SPV transaction is so complex (as some CDO and ABS CDO transactions apparently were) that disclosure would be insufficient. In that context, there are at least two ways in which material conflicts arise. For securities backed by subprime 40 See, e.g., Credit & Blame: How Rating Firms' Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at A1 (quoting a market observer): "A lot of institutional investors bought [mortgage-backed] securities substantially based on their ratings [without fully understanding what they bought], in part because the market has become so complex." Cf. Blinder, supra note 33 (arguing that the MBS, especially the CDOs, "were probably too complex for anyone's good"). See also Malcolm Gladwell, Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much Information, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2007 (distinguishing between transactions that are merely "puzzles" and those that are truly "mysteries"). To the extent complexity is merely a puzzle, investment bankers theoretically could understand it. 41 The disclosure documents ordinarily consist of a prospectus and a prospectus supplement, each close to two-hundred pages long. 42 Schwarcz, supra note 37. 43 The term "Originator" is defined supra note 16. 44 Schwarcz, supra note 37, at 30. See also id. at 32-33 (showing how to identify these transactions, defined as "disclosure-impaired transactions").
mortgages, the interests of mortgage originators, absent their taking a prior or pari passu risk of loss, are misaligned with that of investors in those securities. 45 To mitigate this type of conflict, perhaps mortgage originators should be required to take some risk of loss. Secondly, agency-cost conflicts arise when the interests of individual investment bankers who structure, sell, or invest in securities are misaligned with the interests of the institutions for which they work. 46 For example, certain losses of institutional investors such as Bear Stearns appear to have resulted from losses in CDO investments by controlled or managed hedge funds. 47 If managers of those hedge funds were paid according to hedge-fund industry custom-in which "fund managers reap large rewards on the upside without a corresponding punitive downside" 48 -they would have had significant conflicts of interest with the institutions owning the hedge funds. 49 To mitigate this type of conflict, these individuals should be paid in a manner that better aligns their interests with the interests of the institutions for which they work.
Restricting conflicts of interest, as a supplement to disclosure, is only a secondbest solution. It would not, for example, solve the problem that, even absent conflicts, Hedge funds sometimes impose a limited punitive downside, that managers who lose money may not receive future bonuses until they subsequently make money above a "high watermark." MARK J. P. ANSON, THE HANDBOOK OF ALTERNATIVE ASSETS 361 (2003) . Generally, however, there is no clawback of past bonuses, so these managers can go to another hedge fund where they will not be subject to this liability. Id. at 85 (reporting that "clawbacks are rare in the hedge fund world"). 49 In this regard, the reader should distinguish these conflicts of interest not only from the agency-cost problem discussed above but also from the potential conflict of interest discussed infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text between mortgage originators and investors.
understand the highly complex transactions in which they recommend their institutions invest. Such individuals might, for example, view the possibility of losses as remote, or anticipate being in a new job if and when losses occurred, or simply feel safe following the herd of other bankers. 50
There do not, however, appear to be any perfect solutions. Government already takes a somewhat paternalistic stance to mitigate disclosure's inadequacy by mandating minimum investor sophistication for investing in complex securities, yet sophisticated investors and qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) are the very investors who lost the most money in the subprime financial crisis. 51 And any attempt by government to restrict firms from engaging in complex transactions would be highly risky because of the potential of inadvertently banning beneficial transactions. 52
Hypothesis: Even when disclosure is adequate and investors understand it perfectly (i.e., they have perfect knowledge of the risk), disclosure alone will be inadequate to address at least systemic risk in financial markets. 50 Schwarcz, supra note 37, at 2, 14-15. Outside of an institutional-industry context, there may be further misalignment of incentives because of higher employee turnover. Id. at 14 (observing that employee turnover reduces accountability For this anomaly, this article examines the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis: Structured finance facilitated an easy-entrant and undisciplined mortgage lending industry by enabling mortgage lenders to sell off loans as they are made ("originate and distribute"). This created moral hazard to the extent mortgage lenders therefore did not have to live with the credit consequences of their loans. For that reason, which was probably exacerbated by the fact that they could make money on the volume of loans originated, 56 the underwriting standards of mortgage lenders naturally fell. 57
Anecdotal evidence suggests this hypothesis has at least some truth. 58 Another possible solution is to regulate the loan underwriting standards applicable to mortgage lenders. This approach would be akin to the Federal margin regulations G, U, T, and X imposed in response to the 1929 stock market crash. 68 The then-falling stock values caused margin loans-that is, loans to purchase publicly-listed, or margin, stockto become undercollateralized, in turn causing bank lenders to fail. To protect against a repeat of this problem, the margin regulations require margin lenders to maintain two-toone overcollateralization when securing their loans by margin stock that has been 64 Sanders, supra note 19. 65 Cf. Sanders, supra note 19 (arguing that mortgage originators be required to post capital, to backstop their representations and warranties, for loans originated and then sold). Representations and warranties are even more patently illusory for mortgage originators lacking assets, which simply advance to borrowers the proceeds of selling the loans. See supra note 56. 66 The market actually was beginning to adjust in this fashion shortly before the subprime mortgage crisis started. Jon D. Van Gorp, "Capital Markets Dispersion of Subprime Mortgage Risk" 10 (unpublished Nov. 2007 manuscript, on file with author) (observing that, at the beginning of 2007, "early payment default protection became standardized across the market," requiring loan originators to repurchase loans that fail to make any of their first two or three scheduled payments). 67 This is observed from the author's experience. Cf. Blinder, supra note 33 (suggesting that mortgage loan originators "retain a share of each mortgage"). Also cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing underwriters retaining a portion of the equity when selling ABS CDO securities). 68 Cf. Blinder, supra note 33 (suggesting a "suitability standard" for selling mortgage products and that all mortgage lenders be placed under federal regulation).
purchased, directly or indirectly, with the loan proceeds. 69 Imposing a minimum realestate-value-to-loan overcollateralization on all mortgage loans secured by the real estate financed would likewise protect against a repeat of the subprime mortgage problem.
Unfortunately, though, it would have a high price, potentially impeding and increasing the cost of home ownership and imposing an administrative burden on lenders and government monitors. 70
Hypothesis: Structured finance dispersed subprime mortgage risk so widely that there was no clear incentive for any given investor to monitor it. Hypothesis: Structured finance can make it difficult to work out problems with an underlying asset class-in this case, for example, making it difficult to work out the underlying mortgage loans because the beneficial owners of the loans are no longer the mortgage lenders but a broad universe of financial-market investors. As a result, mortgage defaults result in unnecessarily high losses.
News stories observe that homeowners have been unable to restructure, or "modify," their loans because they cannot identify who owns the loans. 74 Laws protecting mortgage borrowers, however, suggest this concern may be overstated. For example, "[u]pon written request by the obligor, the servicer shall provide the obligor, to 72 The very assumption that structured finance reallocates risk to parties best able to bear it also may have failed in the subprime context. See, e.g., e-mail from Bookstaber, supra note 24 (indicating that "[r]ather than spreading the risk to those who were most comfortable holding the assets and taking the risk, many of the [holders] were 'hot money' hedge funds that would have to run for cover at the very time the risk taking function was most critical" There nonetheless might be a residual structural concern insofar as structured finance may have dispersed subprime mortgage risk so widely that there is no clear incentive for any given investor to monitor the risk. Whether that has occurred is uncertain. Even if it has, the evil is not so much risk dispersion per se as the failure to align incentives sufficiently to promote monitoring.
C. Why did a problem with the subprime mortgage-backed securities markets quickly infect the markets for prime mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed securities? 87 85 In the current subprime crisis, of course, the underlying deal documentation is already in place. Because existing documentation cannot be easily renegotiated, the government might consider legislating changes. Any such changes that are subsidized in whole or part by government, however, could foster moral hazard, potentially making future homeowners more willing to take risks when borrowing. 86 Engel, supra note 81. 87 Cf. Andrews, supra note 28, at 15 (observing from the subprime financial crisis that "liquidity in markets for structured investments can disappear immediately as soon as there are any shocks-no buying or selling at all in an entire sector"-although not explaining why this occurred To what extent does this hypothesis turn, however, on CDO and ABS CDO securities being mark-to-model, not mark-to-market (because such securities are not actively traded, there is no established market price to which to mark them)? If shared models are wrong, an unanticipated error is shared by everyone.
Summary. The discussion above provides three explanations for why a problem with the subprime mortgage-backed securities markets quickly infected the prime markets. 98 Faced for the first time with the reality that highly-rated tranches of sub-prime MBS could lose money, investors appear to have lost confidence, shunning all complex securitization products. To this extent, future investors should try to better understand these types of investments so that confidence is built on a firmer foundation.
Adverse selection also helps to explain the rapid infection. (reporting that hedge funds borrowed large amounts of money to invest in CDO securities). Failure of these hedge funds resulting from losses on these securities can affect the bank lenders. Another possible amplifying mechanism is that certain banksponsored investment conduits purchased AAA-rated CDO and ABS CDO securities with the proceeds of short-term commercial paper. As the CDO and ABS CDO securities were marked down in value and investors failed to roll over their commercial paper, the bank sponsors faced the prospect of having to make payments to the conduits pursuant to liquidity and credit-enhancement facilities. Carrick Mollenkamp & Margot Patrick, Credit Crunch: Citigroup Moves to Quell SIV Concerns, WALL ST. J., Sep. 7, 2007 at C2 were good and which were bad. They therefore stopped investing in all securitization products. Adverse selection can be mitigated through information, in this case, for example, by valuing the securities and ascertaining the holdings of securitization counterparties. Because there was no market for CDO and ABS CDO securities, however, these securities could not be valued at "market." Valuation therefore was priced off quantitative models. Marking-to-model, however, creates intrinsic valuation uncertainties, and indeed the valuations priced off those models proved hopelessly unreliable. The indirect holding system for securities also made it very difficult to ascertain whether CDO and ABS CDO securities were held by securitization counterparties, and as long as that system continues to dominate securities holdings this difficulty will remain.
The third explanation is also related to valuation. Absent a real market, valuation of CDO and ABS CDO securities must, as indicated, be priced off quantitative models. It is critical, then, that the range of models used by investors be sufficiently diverse that errors in one model will not cut across all models.
D. Why was the market-discipline approach, along with other existing protections, insufficient?
Under a market-discipline approach, the regulator's job is to ensure that the private sector exercises the type of diligence that enables markets to work efficiently. 99
For this failure, this article examines the following hypotheses:
(reporting that Citibank was unable to raise money through the sale of asset-backed commercial paper , at 6 (observing that, to the extent hedge funds are regulated solely through market discipline, government's "primary task is to guard against a return of the weak market discipline that left major market participants overly vulnerable to market shocks").
Hypothesis: For reasons already discussed in this article, certain foundations of a market-discipline approach have rotted.
Regulators implement a market-discipline approach by ensuring that market participants have access to adequate information about risks and by arranging incentives so that those who influence an institution's behavior will suffer if that behavior generates losses. 100 In the recent financial crisis, however, disclosure inadequately conveyed information about the risks for various reasons, 101 including possibly that certain of the structured finance transactions were too complex to be adequately disclosed. 102
Furthermore, the incentives of managers did not appear to be fully aligned with those of their institutions, so managers would not necessarily suffer-and, more importantly, they would not expect to suffer-if their behavior generated losses to their institutions. 103 Additionally, in the context of systemic risk, there are fundamental misalignments between institutional and financial market interests. 104 Market discipline alone is therefore an insufficient approach.
Hypothesis: A market-discipline approach failed for other reasons. 103 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (observing potential agency-cost conflicts between investment bankers who structured, sold, or invested in securities and the institutions for which they worked). 104 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (arguing that structured finance may have dispersed subprime mortgage risk so widely that there was no clear incentive for any given investor to monitor it). See also infra note 108 and accompanying text (observing that from the standpoint of systemic risk, a market-discipline approach is inherently suspect because no firm has sufficient incentive to limit its risk taking in order to reduce the danger of systemic contagion for other firms).
One such reason might be the simple human greed of market participants. 105 Until recently, it appeared that a market-discipline approach worked well for the banking and securities-brokerage industries, which in large part have been subject to this regulatory approach. 106 Did something change to increase the potential for greed? Query also whether "greed" is the appropriate term, or whether this hypothesis turns on the desire by market participants to increase risk-adjusted performance, which itself may be motivated by (among other things) greed.
Another such reason is that, absent prescriptive rules, market discipline is undermined by the availability heuristic 107 as well as the almost endemic shortage of funding for regulatory monitoring.
Hypothesis: At least regarding systemic risk, market discipline is inherently suspect because no firm has sufficient incentive to limit its risk taking in order to reduce the danger of systemic contagion for other firms.
Recall that the externalities of systemic failure include social costs that can extend far beyond market participants, resulting in a type of tragedy of the commons. 108 Thus, a firm that exercises market discipline by reducing its leverage will marginally reduce the 105 Cf. Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 79 (1998) (discussing greed as a central factor that, in the hedge-fund context, transforms a successful hedging or moderately risky investment strategy into one of high-risk speculation). Bernanke suggests, however, a possible alternative psychological explanation, at least in the case of the failure of marketdiscipline in the case of LTCM's investors: that those "[i]nvestors, perhaps awed by the reputations of LTCM's principals, did not ask sufficiently tough questions about the risks that were being taken to generate the high returns." Bernanke, supra note 99, at 1.
Compare the "over-reliance" hypothesis, supra note 28 and accompanying text. 106 Summary. The discussion above shows that a market-discipline approach must be supplemented and that market discipline is particularly suspect as a protection against systemic risk.
E. Why did the rating agencies fail to anticipate the downgrades?
This failure is particularly problematic to the extent of investor over-reliance on rating-agency ratings. 110 For this failure, this article examines the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis: Rating agencies failed because of conflicts of interest in the way they are paid.
Rating agencies are customarily paid by the issuer of securities, but investors rely heavily on their ratings. 111 This is technically a conflict, but it is not usually a material conflict. Ratings, for example, are made independently of the fee received. 112
Furthermore, the reputational cost of a bad rating usually far exceeds the income received by giving the rating. 113
In the subprime crisis, though, the conflict would have been more material than normal because ratings were given to innumerable issuances of CDO and ABS CDO A more likely explanation for the failure is that ratings are judgment calls by human beings, and mistakes inevitably will be made. 124 has been concentrated particularly in securitized products, where the demand is especially driven by regulated intermediaries"). However even if there was grade inflation, the consequences are unclear since investors were probably not misled but simply did not care so long as the securities purchased were in fact rated investment grade. 124 Cf. Standard & Poor's, New Actions to Strengthen Ratings (Feb. 7, 2008 ) (on file with author) (proposing various procedural review steps to minimize human failure in the ratings process).
Whatever the reasons are for the failure by rating agencies to anticipate the downgrades, it should be noted that rating agencies may not be perfect but the idea of rating agencies is important. Individual investors face relatively high costs to assess the creditworthiness of complex securities. Rating agencies can make this assessment on behalf of many individual investors, thereby achieving an economy of scale. 125
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This article has suggested various insights into protecting financial markets.
Additional insight comes by recognizing that most of the causes of the discussed anomalies and failures can be divided into three categories: (i) conflicts; (ii) complacency; (iii) complexity. 126
The first category, conflicts, is the most tractable. Once identified, conflicts can often be managed. For example, this article has shown that the excesses of the originateand-distribute model can be managed by aligning the interests of mortgage lenders and investors by requiring the former to retain a risk of loss. Some conflicts, though, may be harder to manage in practice, such as conflicts in how rating agencies are paid.
The second category, complacency, is less tractable because solutions to complacent behavior can require changing human nature, an obviously impossible task.
After a crisis, everyone focuses on avoiding that crisis in the future (though hopefully also avoiding the all-too-human tendency to fall into the rut of fighting the "last war" 127 ). The subprime mortgage crisis appears to have discredited, though, at least one form of complacency: widespread investor obsession with securities that have no established market and, instead, are valued by being marked-to-model.
Other forms of complacency are rational and can only be addressed through structural changes. For example, investors will almost certainly continue to over-rely on rating-agency ratings, so long as the cost of making independent credit investigations remains high. If rating agencies continue to provide unreliable ratings, perhaps investors should consider whether innovative collective-action approaches, such as collective credit determinations, might prove more reliable. 129
The third category, complexity, is least tractable. 130 Complexity can deprive investors and other market participants of the information needed for markets to operate effectively. It was, for example, a central culprit responsible for the failure of disclosure in the subprime crisis. Even beyond disclosure, complexity is increasingly a metaphor for the modern financial system and its potential for failure, illustrated further by the tight coupling that causes markets to move rapidly into a crisis mode; the potential convergence in quantitatively-constructed investment strategies; the layers inserted between obligors on loans and other financial assets and the assets' beneficial owners, which make it difficult to work out underlying defaults 131 ; and the problem of adverse selection, in which investors, uncertain which investments or counterparties are sound, begin to shun all investments. Solving problems of financial complexity may well be the ultimate 21 st century market goal.
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/ht1002072.shtml (statement of the author, at p. 68 of transcript). 128 Cf. supra note 39 and accompanying text (observing that investors quickly forget past finance crisis and "go for the gold"). 129 Collective approaches, though, might face potential antitrust hurdles. 130 Cf. Michael Mandel, The Economy's Safety Valve, BUS. WK., Oct. 22, 2007, at 36 (observing that "in today's complex and globally integrated financial markets, it's almost impossible for regulators to plug every hole").
These categories are broad, but they do not capture everything. One might propose, for example, a fourth category: cupidity. Greed, however, is so ingrained in human nature and so intertwined with the other categories that it adds little insight to view it as a separate category.
These categories also do not capture the problem of systemic risk, whose uniqueness arises from a type of tragedy of the commons. Because the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual market participants whereas the costs of exploitation are distributed among an even wider class of persons, market participants have insufficient incentive to internalize their externalities. Government, however, can provide solutions, such as creating a liquidity provider of last resort to purchase securities in collapsing markets (albeit at profitable discounts to minimize moral hazard) in order to mitigate market instability that would lead to systemic collapse.
A final possible inquiry is to ask whether periodic financial market instabilities are harmful or, in the long run, possibly helpful to the economy. For example, perhaps the subprime financial crisis, or something like it, was needed to turn around the incentive-distorting liquidity glut of the past few years? 132 Financial market instabilities are believed to be acceptable if they are "relatively limited in scope," even if deep in their narrow impact. 133 Indeed, such instabilities "may serve as critical safety valves." 134 There are, however, two concerns. On a distributional level, market instabilities impact people, and in the subprime crisis many of those affected have been "low-income" individuals. 135 131 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Hirsch, supra note 84 (observing that, because of these layers, the "instruments were so complex that no one followed the trail"). 132 Cf. Balakrishnan et al., supra note 58 (discussing the liquidity glut). 133 Mandel, supra note 130, at 34. 134 Id. at 34. 135 Mandel, supra note 130, at 36-37. That many of the affected individuals have been "low-income" individuals does not conflict with this article's earlier observation (see text accompanying note 51, supra) that QIBs are the investors who lost the most money in the subprime crisis. Low-income individuals lost money not as investors but as foreclosed homeowners.
